Away from the hustle and bustle of the new Parliament in Westminster, MPs across the UK are settling into the routine of dealing with their constituents and their everyday problems. But with the increasing abuse of politicians, the “routine” of constituency work is changing – and perhaps not for the better. Sean Haughey And Neil Matthews Consider how increased security measures around MPs could impact on constituency work and, consequently, the experience of democratic representation at local level.

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Abuse of MPs, both online and offline, is becoming an increasingly common feature of British political life. In the worst cases, abuses have escalated into violent and even fatal attacks on MPs. In response, MPs are adopting new security measures at constituency level to protect themselves from harm. These measures range from the subtle (e.g. no longer publishing details of operations) to the less subtle (such as wearing stab vests). We know how these developments are affecting MPs personally, not least in terms of their mental health. We also know the financial implications, with the cost of keeping MPs safe having soared in recent years. But what about the impact on representation and democracy? Will MPs be able to carry out their representative role just as well despite tighter security protocols? Or will there be a cost to representative democracy in securing constituency service?

When MPs tighten the security of their constituency services, the most obvious costs relate to accessibility.

The trade-off between security and accessibility

All security systems come at a cost. When MPs tighten the security of their constituency offices, the most obvious cost is in terms of accessibility. This trade-off between security and accessibility manifests itself in one of two ways: either by reducing opportunities for constituents to meet with their MP, or by introducing security protocols that make access routes more difficult. As for reduced opportunities for interaction between constituents and MPs, take for example those MPs who no longer hold office hours in public places (e.g. shopping malls) for security reasons. Let us also think of the MP who, after repeated verbal abuse, admits that he no longer socialises in his own constituency. These examples of withdrawal from the public sphere are problematic because even through the most innocuous and spontaneous interactions – for example, in the local pub or supermarket – MPs develop their constituency antennae and learn more about the issues that matter to their constituents:

We try to berecognisable as a constituency MP, available, accessible to all. An effective constituency MP is the person who people feel they can go to in the pub or, frustrating as it sometimes is, approach when they’re out shopping.

The social science findings underline the therapeutic value of personal meetings between MPs and voters.

Access to MPs may be made more difficult by security measures in a number of ways. For example, some MPs have replaced office hours with appointments, a formality that is likely to result in some voters being turned away. We also know that some MPs have stopped offering face-to-face office hours on the advice of the police and are instead offering only online meetings. While this could speed up access to MPs for digitally savvy citizens, it will discourage those who do not have the necessary skills from attending. Moreover, the value and quality of online meetings – compared to face-to-face meetings – is questionable. The social science evidence underlines the therapeutic value of face-to-face meetings between MPs and voters. These face-to-face meetings are key to developing a ‘co-presence’ and help build a ‘human bridge’ that makes voters feel listened to. These benefits could be much harder to achieve if the interaction takes place over a screen. Similarly, with face-to-face meetings, the personal touch and sense of intimacy are likely to be compromised by the presence of security guards.

Some of the security measures in constituency offices could provoke similar reactions among voters: fear, distrust, paranoia and exclusion.

The symbolic costs

Public spaces convey political and cultural messages. So what messages are being conveyed to the public when MPs implement airport (or even prison) style security measures in their constituency offices? Think bulletproof glass, CCTV, reinforced doors, panic buttons and so on. While these measures may reassure MPs and their staff, the effect on voters might be just the opposite, perhaps marking the space as somehow unsafe so that visitors need to be on their guard. Research in other places that have been fitted with security measures suggests this: defensive urban architecture (designed to mitigate terrorist attacks) has a chilling effect on public democratic culture, triggering a range of subjective emotional responses in passers-by: fear, distrust, paranoia and exclusion. Some of the security measures in constituency offices might provoke a similar response in voters. Take, for example, the MP who tells his constituents to “expect to be searched” when they arrive at his surgery:

We are following security guidelines. Security guards and/or police will therefore screen voters who come to in-person voting appointments. Please bring photo ID and leave bags and coats at home if possible, as these are not allowed in the meeting room. You must remain outside the meeting room and must expect to be searched.

(For information for voters, see Julian Smith MP’s website)

For architect Stephen Flusty, places and spaces that involve security precautions – such as searches of people or property – are the epithet of “edgy”. In other words, they are characterised by a tense and nervous atmosphere. So we might ask: how many constituency offices in the UK show signs of this nervousness?

In a wider crisis of representation, where people in the UK often feel unrepresented in Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating effect of constituency services will be weakened if MPs are harder to reach (or are perceived to be).

Security and trust: a vicious circle?

Security measures at constituency level could therefore be counterproductive, as they could undermine the very representative connections that MPs are trying to protect. Until now, the connection between MPs and voters at local level has been seen as a positive exception to the otherwise increasing political distancing in Western democracies. But what if new security measures at local level make engagement more difficult and create distance (both figuratively and literally) between MPs and voters?

In a wider crisis of representation, where people in the UK generally do not feel represented by Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating effect of constituency services will be reduced if MPs are harder to reach (or perceived to be) or less present at local level. Moreover, if the perception of a disconnect between politicians and the public is a driver of political distrust, and this distrust in turn fuels the abuse of politicians, the security measures that MPs take to contain this threat may in fact exacerbate it.

Importantly, the trend towards security politics in British political life looks set to intensify. Speaker of the House of Commons Lindsay Hoyle – a long-time advocate of better protection for MPs – has called for a change in Parliament’s “culture of security”. To a similar end, the outgoing Conservative government passed a £31 million package to strengthen MPs’ security at constituency level; the recently published Walney report recommends even greater strengthening. Greater attention is needed to understand how such enhanced security shapes the character and implementation of representative democracy in the UK – and the myriad costs it entails for politicians and the public.

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This blog post is based on a recent article by the authors on the subject of MPs’ security, published in Parliamentary Affairs and openly accessible.

All articles published on this blog reflect the views of the author(s) and do not represent the position of LSE British Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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